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Abstract
Current low-latency anonymity systems use complex
overlay networks to conceal a user’s IP address, intro-
ducing significant latency and network efficiency penalties
compared to normal Internet usage. Rather than obfuscat-
ing network identity through higher level protocols, we
propose a more direct solution: a routing protocol that
allows communication without exposing network identity,
providing a strong foundation for Internet privacy, while
allowing identity to be defined in those higher level proto-
cols where it adds value.
Given current research initiatives advocating “clean
slate” Internet designs, an opportunity exists to design an
internetwork layer routing protocol that decouples identity
from network location and thereby simplifies the anonymity
problem. Recently, Hsiao et al. proposed such a protocol
(LAP), but it does not protect the user against a local
eavesdropper or an untrusted ISP, which will not be ac-
ceptable for many users. Thus, we propose Dovetail, a next-
generation Internet routing protocol that provides anony-
mity against an active attacker located at any single point
within the network, including the user’s ISP. A major design
challenge is to provide this protection without including an
application-layer proxy in data transmission. We address
this challenge in path construction by using a matchmaker
node (an end host) to overlap two path segments at a
dovetail node (a router). The dovetail then trims away
part of the path so that data transmission bypasses the
matchmaker. Additional design features include the choice
of many different paths through the network and the joining
of path segments without requiring a trusted third party. We
develop a systematic mechanism to measure the topological
anonymity of our designs, and we demonstrate the privacy
and efficiency of our proposal by simulation, using a model
of the complete Internet at the AS-level.
1. Introduction
Our society has experienced a dramatic increase in the
extent to which daily life is conducted online, with socializ-
ing, shopping, learning, and banking via the Internet now an
accepted norm. However, parallel advances in technology
have enabled widespread tracking, storage, and correlation
of our online activities, and business models have evolved
for companies to monetize the user data they collect [1],
[2]. Taken together, these factors mean that Internet privacy
has become a pressing issue, and one that we argue could
benefit from technological solutions.
When we use the Internet, a wide range of identifying
information is commonly revealed, but one of the hardest
forms of identity to remove is that defined by the network
routing protocol (layer 3), since this identity is used to
deliver data. In today’s Internet, IP is the primary layer 3
protocol and IP addresses are in every data packet. Record-
ing a user’s IP address can allow an adversary to uniquely
identify her, link that identity with her online activity, cor-
relate connections to different services, and partially reveal
her geographical and network locations. Previous work has
proposed low-latency anonymity systems to conceal a user’s
identity [3], [4], including her IP address. Tor in particular
has been adopted by hundreds of thousands of privacy-
concious users worldwide [5]. Current anonymity systems,
however, work by creating an overlay network on top of the
layer 3 protocol, requiring a sequence of IP transmissions
to disguise the original sender. This sequential forwarding
and the queueing and processing required in intermediary
nodes can incur substantial latency and network efficiency
penalties.
We prefer an alternative formulation for this problem:
Rather than attempting to conceal a global layer 3 identifier
by adding complexity in application protocols, we believe
that the layer 3 protocol should not reveal a global identity.
Instead, we leave identity management to higher layers
in the protocol stack, in only those applications where it
provides mutual benefit.
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While privacy by itself is unlikely to motivate a change
away from IP routing, a range of additional concerns
have emerged within the networking field [6], including
scalability, security, mobility, challenged environments, and
network management, leading to major research initiatives
investigating “clean slate” Internet designs [7]–[9] that
could be used to build the next-generation Internet (NGI). A
wide range of different NGI routing concepts have already
been proposed as a result of these activities [10]–[16].
Network virtualization research, showcased in testbeds such
as GENI [17], offers hope for a progressive transition to
a future routing protocol. These initiatives in NGI provide
an opportunity to imagine anonymous communications that
do not rely on an overlay network.
We thus propose Dovetail, an NGI routing protocol
that prevents association of source and destination by an
attacker located at any fixed point within the network.
Recently, Hsiao et al. proposed LAP, a lightweight NGI
anonymity protocol [18]. Unlike LAP, however, Dovetail
provides protection against observation by local eavesdrop-
pers and by an untrusted ISP, which is a critical requirement
for many privacy-conscious users.
A major design challenge is to provide this protection
without including an inline application-layer entity (i.e. a
proxy) in data transmission, which would be much slower
than only traversing routers. We address this challenge
in path construction by asking a matchmaker node (an
end host) to put together two path segments so that they
overlap at a dovetail node (a router), and enabling the
dovetail to trim away part of the data forwarding path to
remove the matchmaker. This technique is implemented
using public-key operations only at the source and the
matchmaker, while routers use only symmetric encryption
and decryption of short header fields and a simple hash
chain. The protocol enables the choice of many different
paths through the network and does not require a trusted
third party.
In brief, our key contributions are: (1) a novel privacy-
preserving NGI routing protocol, (2) a systematic mech-
anism for measuring anonymity in terms of topological
identity, and (3) evaluation of our protocol in terms of
topological anonymity using an Internet-scale simulation.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 introduces our objectives and the adversary we
design against. Section 3 discusses both source-controlled
routing and low-latency anonymity systems, including two
systems that we build upon. Section 4 presents the de-
sign of Dovetail in a sequence of increasingly detailed
perspectives, from the broad design down to the packet
structure. Section 5 analyzes the security of our system by
considering potential attacks and our defenses, and derives
the information available to a passive attacker. Section 6 de-
scribes our evaluation of the protocol. Section 7 concludes
with a summary of our findings and recommendations for
further work.
2. Objectives
In this section, we describe the goals of the system we
intend to deliver and the attacker we design against.
2.1. Anonymity Objectives
We refer to the party who initiates a connection as the
source and the opposite party as the destination, although
data is able to pass in both directions once the connection
is established. Using the terminology of Pfitzmann and
Hansen [19], we aim to provide unlinkability between the
source and destination, such that no network location is
able to sufficiently distinguish whether the source and
destination are related, except for the source itself. This
implies that network locations with good information on
the source identity have little information on the destination
identity, and vice versa. Throughout our work, we con-
strain ourselves to the identifying properties defined at the
network layer: network identity and network location, or
topographical anonymity [18].
We do not protect the packet contents, which reside
in higher network layers and are thus out of scope for
this paper. Content should be protected end-to-end using a
protocol such as IKEv2, which protects sender and receiver
identities [20]. Such protection is effectively mandatory
for strong anonymity protections, as many other forms
of Internet identification exist, such as device fingerprint-
ing [21] and persistent cookies [22]. Additionally, higher-
level protocols like IKEv2 should be used with restricted
options and implementations to limit the possibility of
fingerprinting.
2.2. Performance & Practicality Objectives
Any anonymity system must offer acceptable perfor-
mance in order to gain widespread adoption and thus
provide a large set of potential message sources [23]. Per-
formance problems with Tor have been widely discussed,
and they are considered an important factor limiting its
adoption [24], [25]. We aim to provide a lightweight system
where all communication for an established connection
remains within the core networking infrastructure and
occurs at layer 3. This avoids the frequently slow last
mile connections [26] in overlay anonymity systems and
also the queuing required to move between layers in the
protocol stack. Finally, we require that our system provides
mechanisms to trade anonymity for performance.
Another key to widespread adoption is recruiting service
providers. Our work targets a future Internet, so Dovetail
need only compete with other future routing protocols
rather than motivate service providers to switch away from
IPv4. Today’s ISP business models may not apply, but it
is unlikely that service providers are willing to spend sub-
stantial time and infrastructure for privacy. Our goal is to
ensure that costs for service providers are limited, such that
benefits for privacy-aware consumers are enough incentive
to participate in the protocol. To this end, we recognize that
Internet routers have high throughput and low computing
resources per flow, so we limit cryptographic operations
and avoid maintenance of any per-connection routing state.
Additionally, our design does not require significant extra
traffic and does not violate basic notions of consumer-
provider relationships that exist in today’s Internet.
2.3. Attack Model
Selecting an attack model for anonymity systems is
a challenging task in its own right, as the adversary
may be different for different users and its capabilities
are not known in advance. A few key points guide our
decision. First, protecting a low-latency connection from
an adversary who can observe traffic at multiple points of
the network is very difficult. Tor uses layered encryption
and fixed packet sizes to prevent trivial linkability, but
this comes with significant expense and does not hide
traffic patterns, which are linkable with a small chance
of error [27]. Adding sufficient delays and cover traffic to
mask traffic patterns is expensive and can be undermined
by manipulating the patterns [28], [29]. Thus, like both Tor
and LAP, we do not aim to protect against these attacks.
Second, users may be suspicious of any service provider
that can link them with their Internet activities. This applies
to anonymity service providers, such as Anonymizer.com,
and also to Internet service providers. ISPs have proved
to not be fully trustworthy with private browsing data [30],
[31]. We therefore aim to prevent any element of our system
from being able to deanonymize users. Third, a user’s local
communication may be subject to eavesdropping, e.g. at a
wireless hotspot or by an employer. Unlike LAP, we aim
to protect against such adversaries. Fourth, many of the
adversaries that we aim to protect against would be capable
of various active attacks, such as replay or packet header
manipulation, so we also aim to limit the exposure that
such attacks might cause.
We thus consider an adversary who is active but local.
Active means the adversary is able to initiate connections
and to violate the rules of the protocol for the connections
in which she is involved, in addition to passively monitoring
these connections. We define local as confined to a single
Autonomous System (AS) within the Internet. ASes are
the level at which routing information and policies are
commonly shared, so a compromise in security at one
router may affect multiple routers controlled by the same
AS. In contrast, in order to span multiple ASes, an attack
must either compromise multiple organizations or involve
collusion between these organizations. We note that if a
particular set of ASes were suspected of collusion, our
client logic could easily be modified to include no more
than one member of the set in each connection. Our
adversary is assumed to have local knowledge of traffic,
but global knowledge of the network topology and routing
data.
More concretely, the possible attackers we aim to protect
against include: a local eavesdropper, the source ISP, the
destination ISP, any single AS in between, any node facil-
itating our protocol operations, and the destination itself.
Thus, we aim for significantly greater protection than LAP
or a centralized proxy server like Anonymizer.com.
Given that we only protect against a single observation
point, we offer no protection against attacks that require
multiple observation points, even though such attacks may
be practical for state-level adversaries [32] or Internet
exchange points [33]. In common with LAP, but not Tor,
we do not try to prevent trivial linkability based on packet
contents and sizes. This means that linking attacks with
multiple observation points need lower computational and
storage resources and succeed with fewer observations than
against Tor. Additionally, if both the source and destination
are customers of the same ISP, it is simple for the ISP
to correlate traffic. Again, Tor provides basic protection
that makes this attack slightly harder, while both LAP and
Dovetail provide no protection.
Finally, given recent revelations about the NSA and
GCHQ, some will argue that an anonymity system should
protect against such adversaries, who may view traffic over
undersea cables [34], [35] and perhaps could target Internet
Exchanges (IXs) [33]. We believe that Dovetail is flexible
enough to accommodate such consideration into the routing
mechanisms, but we leave the design and evaluation of such
an extension to future work.
3. Background
In this section, we cover two research areas of direct rel-
evance to our problem: source-controlled routing protocols
and low-latency anonymity systems. Within each area, we
describe a proposal that our design builds upon.
3.1. Source-Controlled Routing
One theme spanning a number of next-generation Inter-
net routing proposals is that of source-controlled routing, in
which the originator of a data packet has some control over
the route it takes, usually using routing control information
carried in the data packet. In some protocols, the source
has influence over the route but not complete control [14],
[16]; in others, the source explicitly declares the route that
should be taken [12], [15]. As we explain in Section 4.1,
this ability to express a route at the source has benefits
for anonymity in addition to the robustness and flexibility
considerations that initially motivated the research. IPv4
includes source control options [36], but these can be used
to violate firewall rules and routing policies and are nor-
mally disabled. We assert that these security concerns stem
from inadequate consideration of security in the design of
IPv4 [37] and need not apply to all implementations of
source-controlled routing.
3.1.1. Pathlet Routing. Pathlet routing [12] is one example
of a source-controlled routing system. Each entity within a
network defines a number of virtual nodes (or vnodes) and
advertises path segments (or pathlets) that pass between
these vnodes. Vnodes are a virtual construct, so a single
physical router may process packets for multiple vnodes, or
a single vnode may be distributed across multiple physical
routers. Each vnode is defined by a forwarding table con-
taining the set of allowed outgoing pathlets. All packets ar-
riving from a particular communication peer are processed
by one vnode whose forwarding table defines the set of
allowed routes for that peer. The pathlet protocol provides
an expressive system that is able to represent many different
types of routing policy, although more complex routing
policies require a greater number of vnodes. Godfrey et
al. demonstrate that local transit policies (i.e. policies
only dependent on ingress and egress points for their own
network) may be represented efficiently and independently
of the total network size [12]. This is in contrast to the
BGP exterior gateway protocol [38] commonly used today,
where the forwarding information base must scale linearly
with the total number of advertised IP prefixes.
To send a packet, the source assembles a list of adjacent
pathlets defining the intended route and includes this list in
the packet header. Each pathlet is represented by a variable
length Forwarding ID (FID), an index into the forwarding
table of the vnode that defined the pathlet. When a vnode
receives a packet, it removes the first FID and uses this
as an index into its forwarding table to determine which
link the packet should be sent over. Only legal routes
are defined in the forwarding tables. Therefore, unlike
in BGP, it is impossible to violate the routing policy by
invoking unannounced routes, since no such routes exist.
When a vnode learns of adjacent single-hop pathlets, it
may choose to aggregate these together into a composite
pathlet. The translation from this composite into single-
hop pathlets is stored in the forwarding table, so when a
packet requests the composite path, the forwarding table
is used to restore the component pathlets. Pathlet routing
moves the responsibility for network route creation from
the network infrastructure to the end hosts originating
traffic. This means the large routing information base
embodying network topology need only be consulted each
time a new route is constructed, and not each time a
packet is forwarded. It also provides flexibility for an end
host to control how its packets will traverse the network.
A source may rapidly select alternative routes to achieve
better performance or compensate for network failures,
instead of waiting minutes for an exterior gateway protocol
to converge upon a new route.
3.2. Low-Latency Anonymity Systems
Previous works have introduced a variety of low-latency
anonymity systems whose response time is sufficient for
general-purpose interactive use, including Web browsing.
A wide range of practical systems have been proposed
and some of these have been fielded [3], [4], [39], [40].
Current low-latency anonymity systems may be categorized
as either centralized or distributed. Centralized systems
pass all traffic though an anonymizing proxy, which must
be trusted. Distributed systems overlay an additional net-
work on top of the current layer 3 protocol and therefore
require multiple IP transmissions to deliver each packet
from source to destination. These multiple transmissions,
together with processing inside the intermediate hosts,
contribute to latencies that are substantially higher than
Internet usage without anonymization [41].
3.2.1. Lightweight Anonymity and Privacy. In
Lightweight Anonymity and Privacy (LAP) [18], Hsiao et
al. propose the anonymity scheme that inspires our work.
Their protocol relies upon packet-carried forwarding state,
where the information required to deliver a packet is
stored within the packet itself. To establish a connection,
the source constructs a packet containing a sequence
of autonomous domains (ADs) describing the route. As
each AD receives the packet, it encrypts its own routing
instruction using a private symmetric key and forwards
the packet to the next AD. Once a connection has been
constructed in this manner, data may be exchanged
between the endpoints using the resulting encrypted
header. Each path construction request contains a nonce
that influences the encryption process, allowing a source
to construct multiple unlinkable connections over the same
route by using different nonces. Header padding may be
included to partially obfuscate the path length. During
construction, each AD on the path learns the identity of
all ADs that follow it but not the identity of the ADs
before it. Some information on predecessor identity may
be inferred based on knowledge of the preceding AD,
network topology, routing policy, observed header length,
and observed response time, but these are not quantified.
LAP assumes the user’s own ISP is trustworthy, and it
provides no protection of source-destination unlinkability
against a local eavesdropper or an observer at the source
ISP. Given previous well-publicized ISP indiscretions [30],
[31] and the possibility of a hacker infiltrating this single
point of failure, it seems unlikely that privacy-conscious
users will share this assumption.
Other than LAP, ANDa¯NA is the only other next-
generation Internet anonymity protocol that we know
of [42]. It is only designed for named-data networks and it
is built using onion routing, both of which are very different
from Dovetail.
4. Design
In this section, we first provide context for our design
point and then describe the protocol from four different
perspectives in increasing detail.
4.1. Layer 3 Anonymity Design Space
To provide a broadly applicable anonymity system, we
assert that any layer 3 solution should provide two features:
Deviation from shortest path. An eavesdropper can
measure information on the length of the network path
before and after her1 vantage point. If a routing protocol
always selects the shortest possible route, then when the
shortest route between participants is significantly shorter
or longer than the Internet average, the protocol will reveal
this abnormal distance and limit their anonymity.
Partitioned routing information. When the routing in-
formation is stored as a single field, such as an IP address,
any entity with access to the field may calculate the desti-
nation identity. When routing information is divided across
multiple fields, then an entity must access multiple fields
to learn the destination identity. Fields may be protected
independently to prevent this access.
Source-controlled routing is useful since it accommo-
dates both of these features: when the source of a message
can dictate a path, she is free to pick one that is not
the shortest, and she may express the path as a separate
instruction for each entity along the route. Dovetail uses
construction requests that are traceable in the forwards
direction as presented by Hsiao et al. [18]. Our detailed
design builds upon the pathlet routing protocol presented
by Godfrey et al. [12]. Pathlet routing works well for our
system, but we are not reliant on any unique feature of
this protocol. The principles we describe could be applied
to any protocol that provides complete control over the
selected route and a wide range of allowable routes.
1. Throughout this paper, we use the genders of the standard security
actors: The source, Alice, is female, the destination, Bob, is male, and the
attacker, Eve, is female.
4.2. Network Model
We propose a clear distinction in routing at the AS
boundary; each AS should expose the minimum number
of vnodes and pathlets necessary to satisfy its routing poli-
cies. This distinction provides two practical benefits: First,
minimizing the number of externally visible vnodes reduces
the size of the routing information base that must be held
in end hosts. Second, distinguishing between internal and
external connectivity allows an AS to retain a flexible and
dynamic internal routing policy. As with BGP, adjacent
ASes share routing information to establish the network
topology. This communication should be secured against
MITM attacks that could selectively filter the topology. We
assume that hosts know the numeric identity of the vnodes
they wish to contact. An equivalent to DNS would be
required to translate human-readable identities into vnode
identities. The translation service itself could be accessible
using Dovetail to protect privacy, but is outside the scope
of our current work.
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Internal pathletKey: Subject AS
Figure 1. AS vnode and pathlet structure by routing
policy: a) Strict valley-free, b) Loose valley-free
The most common form of routing policy used in the
Internet today is valley-free routing [43], which reflects
the contractual relationships between ASes. A customer
AS is one who pays a provider AS to forward its traffic,
while two ASes with a peer relationship will each forward
each other’s traffic without payment. In valley-free routing,
each AS will only forward traffic when there is a financial
incentive to do so, i.e. when the traffic originates from
or is destined for a paying customer. As illustrated in
Figure 1a, two vnodes are required per AS to enforce
this strict definition of a valley-free routing policy: one to
receive traffic from customer ASes and one to receive traffic
from peer and provider ASes. Although valley-free routing
is common, BGP allows for arbitrarily complex routing
policies and valley-free routing is not ubiquitous [44]. In
particular, there are a growing number of Internet exchange
points (IXPs), which offer ASes the ability to peer with
each other and thereby save money [45]. Most transit and
access provider ASes will peer with any non-customer
AS [46]. This suggests that peering is compatible with
ASes’ incentives and is likely to continue to be common.
We thus consider a slightly relaxed routing policy, which
we refer to as loose valley-free. In this scheme, an AS
will allow traffic to pass between its peers. The AS would
not receive payment from a customer for performing this
service, but also is not required to make a payment and
could avoid payments at other times if peers provide a
reciprocal service. As shown in Figure 1b, three vnodes
are required per AS to enforce a loose valley-free routing
policy: one to receive traffic from customer ASes, one to
receive traffic from provider ASes, and the third to send
and receive peer traffic.
For good anonymity properties as described in Sec. 4.4,
Dovetail relies on a modest fraction of ASes to use the
loose valley-free policy or other policies that are less strict
than valley-free routing. If all ASes use strict valley-free
routing, Dovetail still provides anonymity, but with smaller
anonymity sets.
4.3. Path Construction
A Dovetail path comprises multiple path segments. As
we explain in Section 5.2, an AS that is present on a path
segment may learn the identity of subsequent ASes and its
direct predecessor, but not earlier ASes. Figure 2 illustrates
the Dovetail path creation process.
Source
Dovetail
Destination
Source
Destination
Source
Dovetail
Matchmaker
Source
Dovetail
Matchmaker
Source
Dovetail
Matchmaker
Step 1: Source constructs 
Head segment to 
Matchmaker via Dovetail
Step 2: Matchmaker 
begins Tail segment 
to Destination
Step 3: Dovetail detects 
and removes loop 
through Matchmaker
Step 4: Dovetail continues 
Tail segment to Destination
Step 5: Source and destination 
communicate over connection
Figure 2. Construction of a Dovetail connection
The path cannot be constructed directly from the source
to the destination, since the source’s ISP would be able
to link source and destination. Instead, we make use of a
randomly selected, untrusted third-party vnode called the
matchmaker. This matchmaker may either be an end host
or functionality exposed by a service provider. Providing
matchmaker services should cost little relative to enabling
our protocol in routers. The identities of vnodes willing to
act as matchmakers could be distributed as a part of routing
information maintenance.
The source encrypts the identity of the final destination
using a public key for the matchmaker and builds a head
path segment to the matchmaker, who then extends the path
to the destination with a tail path segment. Here, the source
ISP no longer learns the identity of the destination, only
of the matchmaker. The matchmaker learns the identity of
the destination, but cannot identify the source through the
intervening ASes. The source may learn the matchmaker’s
public key without compromising anonymity by requesting
a signed certificate over the same path used to establish
the connection. To improve performance and minimize the
trust we must place in the matchmaker, we prefer that
the matchmaker not be involved in the exchange of data.
Therefore, we require that the head and tail segments cross
at some vnode, referred to as the dovetail2. The source
encrypts the identity of the dovetail and provides it to the
matchmaker for inclusion on the tail segment. The dovetail
detects the crossing condition and joins the two segments,
removing the loop in the path along with the matchmaker.
The tail path segment would ideally be selected by the
source, but the source does not have complete knowledge
of distant Internet topology. The matchmaker has sufficient
knowledge to construct a path to the destination, but the
user’s anonymity can be degraded if an AS appears on both
the head and tail segments, and therefore we prefer that the
tail segment avoids ASes already used on the head segment.
Providing a list of head ASes to the matchmaker would
reveal substantial information on the source identity, so
instead we ask the matchmaker to return a set of potential
tail routes that the source selects from. The source then
sends its choice to the matchmaker to complete the route.
For brevity, we do not include this tail selection mechanism
in our description of the packet design, but we do examine
its effect on anonymity in Section 6.3.
4.4. Segment Route Selection
A source-controlled routing system may attempt to ob-
fuscate path length, but an attacker located on the path
will be able to infer some information about her distance
to the source and destination through round trip timing,
packet length and structure analysis, and active probing. We
prefer a system that is robust even when an attacker learns
path length to one that relies on keeping it hidden. For the
2. We use the term to reflect a dovetail joint in carpentry, where two
elements are joined securely and compactly
remainder of the discussion, we assume the attacker has
perfect knowledge of the number of ASes preceding and
following her own, but limit the value of this knowledge
through a non-deterministic path selection process.
Our mechanism for routing each path segment is based
upon the principle of path diversity, where a large number
of possible paths may be taken from any given source
to any given destination. We note that this is beneficial
for the robustness of the system in addition to its an-
onymity. To achieve path diversity, each host must have
a comprehensive, but not necessarily complete, map of
the network. We extend the pathlet routing protocol by
exporting extra pathlets in addition to the shortest path tree
(SPT). The optimal set of additional pathlets depends on
network size and topology, but our experiments show that
for the current Internet, is it appropriate to export 50%
of the SPT size, selecting pathlets closest to the sender.
An important consequence is that routing knowledge varies
across the network, and so any assessment of available path
options can only be made in the context of the vnode (in
our case, the source or the matchmaker) selecting the path.
Maintenance of routing information in response to network
changes could be performed using path vector distribution
methods similar to BGP [38], but this is not relevant to the
anonymity properties of the system and so is not discussed
further.
When a host constructs a path segment, it will normally
have a wide range of options available with different
costs, where we define cost as the number of times the
route changes AS. Other cost metrics such as latency or
bandwidth could also be integrated into the protocol. The
distribution of options across cost reflects the network
topology between the source and destination. Selecting a
random path uniformly from among the complete set of op-
tions would reveal information about this distribution, such
as picking the most common path cost most frequently, and
thus leak information about the topology. Instead, we use
a cost window approach: we select a path by first selecting
a path cost and then randomly selecting one of the paths
at this cost. We explain this scheme further in Section 6.2.
4.5. Data Packet Structure
Dovetail extends the basic packet format used in pathlet
routing, providing a set of different packet types and pro-
cessing algorithms for each type. These algorithms provide
the following security properties:
1) An AS does not learn the identity of ASes before its
immediate predecessor.
2) AS routing information is protected by a key known
only to the AS.
3) Different connections travelling over the same route
do not produce the same ciphertext.
4) The final ciphertext for each AS depends on the entire
path.
5) An AS may only create a removable loop in the path
when given access to privileged information. This
information is only given to the matchmaker.
Each Dovetail packet contains a type identifier, followed
by one or more variable-length header segments, followed
by the payload. Table 1 summarizes the notation we use in
this section. Figure 3 presents the packet types in terms of
their header segments, while Figure 4 presents the structure
of each header segment.
Path Construction Packet
Construction Return Packet, Encrypted Data Packet,
and Encrypted Response Packet
Plain Packet
Join SegmentTransit Segment PayloadType Unencrypted Segment
Transit Segment PayloadType Unencrypted Segment
PayloadType Unencrypted Segment
Figure 3. Structure for each packet type
Table 1. Packet structure notation
Term Definition
U Unencrypted packet segment. Stores
partial path during construction and
while traversing an AS.
T Transit packet segment. Stores complete
bi-directional path in encrypted form.
J Join packet segment. Facilitates routing
loop detection during path construction.
TA Transit entry for AS A.
JA Join entry for AS A.
idA Identifier for AS A.
liA Transmission link used to enter AS A.
kA Symmetric encryption key for AS A.
pA Sequence of pathlets traversing AS A
in the forward direction.
qA Sequence of pathlets traversing AS A
in the reverse direction.
mA Maximum number of bits required to
represent any path traversing AS A.
N1 , N2 Nonce values. Initialized randomly then
modified during path construction.
off(x) Offset of field x from segment start.
P(TA) Transit entries preceding TA.
F(TA) Transit entries following TA.
H(x) Cryptographically secure hash of x.
E(k, v, x) Encryption of x with key k and IV v.
D(k, v, x) Decryption of x with key k and IV v.
Size FID FID FID
TAOffsetSize TB TN
IDBE(kB,P(TB)||N1, )
N1
JB JNJASize
liBoff(TB) )
Join Header Segment (J)
Transit Header Segment (T)
Unencrypted Header Segment (U)
E(kB,N2||N1,
FID FID FID FID
N2
On construction
After return IDBE(kB,F(TB)||N1, )FID FID FID FID
pB qB
Figure 4. Structure for each header segment type
Dovetail does not perform cryptographic operations on
the packet payload, only on routing information in the
packet header. Restricting our operations to a small number
of bytes in the header allows for fast operation within the
routing infrastructure. Privacy-preserving transport layer
protocols, such as IPsec, may be used to encrypt or authen-
ticate data when needed. To create a Dovetail connection,
the source issues a path construction packet, leading the
destination to respond with a construction return packet.
Once the response is received, the source and destination
may continue to communicate over the connection using a
sequence of encrypted data and encrypted response packets,
each containing the transit segment created during path con-
struction. Vnodes need not store any per-connection state
in order to exchange data. We now discuss each of these
packet types in turn, in order of increasing complexity.
4.5.1. Plain Packet. A plain packet follows the underlying
pathlet routing protocol without the anonymity features
introduced by Dovetail. A plain packet only contains an
unencrypted header segment defining a string of forwarding
table indexes (i.e., FIDs). Upon receipt of a Plain Packet,
each vnode follows the standard pathlet packet processing
algorithm (Figure 5).
4.5.2. Path Construction Packet. A path construction
packet is used to establish an encrypted path through a
matchmaker and dovetail. The source initially constructs
if U is empty then
deliver packet to application layer
else
read and remove first FID from U , f
prepend FIDs at forwarding table index f to U
send packet over link at forwarding table index f
end if
Figure 5. Plain Packet processing
if U is empty then
perform matchmaker processing or send
construction return packet as described in text
else if packet received from different AS then
JoinFound ← False
for JX in J do
off(TX)||liX ← D(kA,N2 ||N1 , JX)
if liX and off(TX) in legal range then
x||p||q ← D(kA, P (TX)||N1 , TX)
if x = idA then
JoinFound ← True
adjust paths in TX for new AS exit
truncate T after TX
truncate J after JX
break
end if
end if
end for
if not JoinFound then
read portion of U passing through A, pA
lookup path in opposite direction, qA
pad pA and qA to a length of mA
TA ← E(kA, P (TA)||N1 , idA||pA||qA)
append TA to T
JA ← E(kA,N2 ||N1 , off(TA)||liA)
append JA to J
end if
N2 ← H(N2 )
perform plain packet processing
else
perform plain packet processing
end if
Figure 6. Path Construction processing within AS A
the packet containing a path to the matchmaker in the
unencrypted segment but no entries in the transit and join
segments. Upon receipt of a path construction packet, the
receiving vnode follows the algorithm shown in Figure 6.
Each time the packet enters a new AS, tests for a loop join
condition by searching for previous join entries encrypted
with a matching key and nonces. If the join condition is
met, the AS deletes all transit and join entries after its
first inclusion on the path. If the join condition is not met,
the AS adds a new encrypted transit entry to describe the
shortest path through the AS in both directions, and a new
fixed-length join entry that enables location of the variable-
length transit entry. Both the join and transit entries are
encrypted with a symmetric key known only to the AS. This
key is used for all connections through the AS but should
be changed periodically to limit the impact of compromise.
A secure hash function is applied to N2 at each new AS,
similar to a Lamport hash chain [47], preventing an attacker
from predicting previous nonce values and therefore from
creating artificial joins.
When a path construction packet is received with an
empty unencrypted segment, the response depends on the
packet payload. If the payload is empty, which is the
case at the destination, the receiver replies with a con-
struction return packet. This packet is created from the
path construction packet by discarding the join segment,
adding a payload containing N1 , and then updating N1 to
H(N1 ||TA...TN ). If the payload contains a continuation
request, which happens at the matchmaker, the matchmaker
decrypts the continuation request with its public key to
learn the identities of the destination and dovetail, the cost
to dovetail, and a prior hash of N2 . The matchmaker uses
this information to compute possible tail paths and return
these to the source for selection as discussed in Section 4.4.
The matchmaker then removes the packet payload, creates
a new unencrypted header segment containing the selected
tail path, and sets N2 to the prior hash received from the
source. This last step ensures that the dovetail receives the
same value of N2 on both the head and tail segments.
4.5.3. Construction Return Packet. A construction return
packet is used to return the selected path to the source.
The transit segment is re-encrypted during return using the
algorithm in Figure 7, such that the final ciphertext depends
upon the entire selected path.
if packet received from different AS then
use offset to locate TA within T
x||pA||qA ← D(kA, P (TA)||payload , TA)
if x 6= idA then
return . Invalid packet
end if
replace current entries in U with qA
TA ← E(kA, F (TA)||N1 , idA||pA||qA
offset ← offset − (len(idA) + 2mA)
end if
perform plain packet processing
Figure 7. Construction Return processing within AS A
4.5.4. Encrypted Data Packet. An encrypted data packet
is used by the source to send data over an existing Dove-
tail connection. The packet is constructed with an empty
unencrypted segment and the previously received transit
segment, with an offset set to zero. Each time an encrypted
data packet enters a new AS, the current transit entry is
decrypted and the unencrypted segment is replaced with the
forward path from this entry, as described by the algorithm
in Figure 8.
if packet received from different AS then
use offset to locate TA within T
x||pA||qA ← D(kA, F (TA)||N1 , TA)
if x 6= idA then
return . Invalid packet
end if
replace current entries in U with pA
offset ← offset + (len(idA) + 2mA)
end if
perform plain packet processing
Figure 8. Encrypted Data processing within AS A
4.5.5. Encrypted Response Packet. An encrypted re-
sponse packet is used by the destination to send data over
an existing Dovetail connection. The packet is constructed
with an empty unencrypted segment and the previously
received transit segment. The offset is set to the end of the
last transit entry. Each time an encrypted response packet
enters a new AS, the current transit entry is decrypted and
the unencrypted segment is replaced with the reverse path
from this entry, as described by the algorithm in Figure 9.
if packet received from different AS then
use offset to locate TA within T
x||pA||qA ← D(kA, F (TA)||N1 , TA)
if x 6= idA then
return . Invalid packet
end if
replace current entries in U with qA
offset ← offset − (len(idA) + 2mA)
end if
perform plain packet processing
Figure 9. Encrypted Response processing within AS
A
5. Security Analysis
In this section, we assess the security of the Dovetail
protocol. We consider a range of anonymity attacks that
might be applied against the protocol and then analyze the
information available to a passive attacker at each point
in the network. We end with brief discussions of timing
attacks and attacks on availability and integrity.
5.1. Attacks on Anonymity
As Dovetail is lightweight, it does not protect against
attacks that succeed against an overlay system like Tor.
In particular, an entity who can observe traffic at multiple
points in the connection can link both of those points, which
can link a source to her destinations. In Dovetail, this is
trivial, as the packet contents are not encrypted differently
at different points in the network. In Tor, however, timing
analysis can enable this linking with high accuracy [28],
[29]. Other attacks that rely on multiple points of ob-
servation, such as selective denial of service [48] and
predecessor [49] attacks will be just as effective in Dovetail.
Additionally, Dovetail is vulnerable to the same types of
side-channel attacks that impact Tor [50]–[54].
Beyond this, however, we need to examine additional
attacks that could leverage the unique aspects of the
Dovetail protocol. The primary information available to a
passive attacker in the network is the cost to the source and
destination and the preceding and following ASes in the
path, and we examine the affect of these on anonymity in
Sections 5.2 and 5.3. Timing attacks are considered briefly
in Section 5.4. Other attacks include:
Observe or correlate packet content. Dovetail is a
layer 3 protocol and does not provide any protections for
the data it carries. In cases where packet content would
reveal identity, or where confidentiality is important, a
higher layer protocol such as IKEv2 should be used to
provide encryption [20].
Correlate connections from a source. Each connection
includes a source-defined nonce, N1 . When the source
changes this nonce, a different ciphertext will be pro-
duced, preventing an observer from associating multiple
connections over the same path from their header content.
When connections between a source-destination pair are
distinctive, and may hence be correlated by some other
property, the source could reuse the same matchmaker and
path to prevent intersection and predecessor attacks.
Replay packets. A replayed packet will take the same path
as its original transmission and therefore not provide an
attacker with new information. An adversary might try to
probe for the source by prepending an unencrypted path to
a recorded packet, but each AS empties the unencrypted
segment on receipt to prevent this attack.
Probe for a later AS. To determine the destination of an
observed connection, an attacker may try to construct many
new connections through the same dovetail and search for
matches in the header ciphertext. Dovetail protects against
this attack by including a hash of the entire path in the IV
for encrypted transit segments. Any change in the selected
path will therefore perturb the ciphertext for all segments.
Probe for an earlier AS. The joining of a Dovetail path
provides confirmation that the joining AS appeared on the
path twice, and an attacker may wish use this feature
to probe for suspected predecessors. During connection
construction, an attacker may attempt to extend the path to
a suspect and then back to herself, where she could observe
whether a join occurred. Our use of hash chaining on N2
prevents this attack, since the attacker cannot replicate the
nonce initially presented to the suspect. The matchmaker
is provided with an earlier nonce to create a legal join and
may perform some probing, but this is heavily constrained
by the dovetail-matchmaker cost limit.
Matchmaker intersection. The matchmaker provides the
source with a set of possible tail segments from which the
source picks one. Since the source will not select an AS
already on the head segment, including it’s own ISP, the
matchmaker could try to offer tail segments that help it
isolate possible source ASes. In particular, if there is a
source AS of interest A, then the matchmaker could pick
tail segments that include likely ASes between itself and A.
If the source avoids these tail segments, it adds to the like-
lihood that the source is in A. However, fully unmasking
the source AS with this type of intersection attack would
require a large number of requests. As matchmakers are
selected randomly from a large set, an attacker located
at any particular matchmaker is unlikely to receive many
connection requests from the same source.
Modify the requested path. An AS along the path could
modify the unencrypted header segment to alter the route
taken for the remainder of the path segment, but gains
little from doing so. All vnodes along a path segment can
identify the destination, and earlier vnodes have a better
knowledge of the source. Thus, an attacker that places
herself later in the same path segment does not learn any
additional information regarding source or destination.
Modify the tail path. The matchmaker could use a differ-
ent tail option than that selected by the source. However,
the matchmaker does not learn whether unselected paths
were acceptable and cannot identify the source and so
cannot predict whether a particular path will be bad for
that source. A matchmaker could speculatively route all
connections through a particular ISP to allow identification
of any sources within that ISP. This attack may be effective
given a sufficient number of matchmakers, but widespread
collusion falls outside our attack model.
5.2. Single Segment Anonymity Analysis
We now examine the source and destination anonymity
at each point along a single path segment as a step towards
analyzing the complete path. We present two approaches for
assessing single segment topological anonymity: a simple
and efficient approach based on set size and a more accurate
approach based on entropy.
5.2.1. Anonymity Set Size. Consider an attacking
AS, ASi, located at cost i in a path segment
AS0, AS1, · · ·ASi−1, ASi · · ·ASn. This AS can identify
its predecessor, ASi−1, but cannot directly identify earlier
ASes, since their routing instructions have been encrypted.
The remaining portion of the segment is not encrypted, and
therefore all following ASes and the destination are known.
ASi can accurately measure the path cost from the source
to itself by using the length of the join segment in the
packet header, and thus it can deduce the total path cost n.
We use SASxy to represent the set of possible sources that
have a shortest path to ASx of cost y.
Shortest Path. When the shortest path is used, an ad-
versary knows that the observed cost for ASi−1 and for
all subsequent ASes must be the shortest cost from the
true source. The set of possible sources is therefore the
intersection of the possible source sets for each observed
AS:
sources(shortest path, ASi) =
n⋂
j=(i−1)
S
ASj
j
If n is close to the minimum or maximum cost present in
the Internet, then few sources will fall into this intersection,
leading to an uncomfortably small anonymity set.
Cost Window Selection. As an alternative, we propose a
cost window selection algorithm to select uniformly at
random a length between some global minimum p (or the
shortest path cost if it is greater) and some global maximum
q. Ideally for anonymity, q should be greater than the
maximum shortest path cost in the network. Given cost
window selection, an attacker cannot make any statement
about the possible message senders, except that each must
be able to form a path of the observed length to the
observed predecessor ASi−1. Our experiments show that
as long as at least a small fraction of ASes use a loose
valley-free routing policy, long path choices are plentiful.
This means that, in most cases, a source can produce a path
at any given cost greater than the minimum. We find this
to be true 96% of the time when 10% of ASes are loose
valley-free. Making an approximation that this is always
true, then the set of possible sources is simply the union
of the sources at every distance less than or equal to the
observed value:
sources(costwindow,ASi) =
i−1⋃
j=0
S
ASi−1
j
By examining the relationship to AASi−1i−1 , it is clear that:
sources(shortest path, ASi) ⊆ sources(costwindow,ASi)
Hence, cost window selection provides an equal-sized or
larger source anonymity set in all cases. In addition, n is
capped to a minimum of q, and therefore very short path
costs with unavoidably small anonymity sets will never
be generated. Using cost window selection, even sources
with a low shortest path cost will occasionally select very
long paths, and therefore the average latency will be higher
than in shortest path selection. A non-uniform probability
distribution can be used to control how frequently larger
costs are selected and limit this performance penalty.
Table 2. Effective anonymity set size notation
Term Definition
S The set of all possible sending vnodes
s The true source vnode
d The destination vnode
ρ The path selected to send data from s to d
a An attacking vnode located on ρ and wishing to
identify s within S
a′ The vnode on ρ immediately preceding a
tρ(x) The portion of path ρ after vnode x
λρ(x) The cost along ρ from the source to x
OBSa The set of observations available to a
R(x, y) The set of paths from x to y
R(x, y, λ) The set of paths from x to y of cost λ
5.2.2. Effective Anonymity Set Size. The preceding anal-
ysis is simple and efficient for an attacker to compute using
only shortest path distances, but with complete knowl-
edge of routing tables, she can achieve a better result.
The probability that a given potential source selected the
observed path depends on the available path options for
that source, and thus it is not uniform across the set of
potential senders. These differences in probability allow
calculation of an effective anonymity set size based on
the entropy of the distribution. The notation we use in
this section is summarized in Table 2. For each possible
source t, the probability of selecting the observed path cost
Pcost match(t) depends only on the path selection algorithm
and the presence or absence of paths in R(t, d) at each cost,
not the number or definition of these paths nor the location
of the attacker. Section 6.2 presents a series of different
options for path length selection, along with their cost
selection probabilities. Once a cost has been selected, a path
of this cost is chosen randomly from the available set. The
probability that t chose a path matching the observations
is thus given by the fraction of paths that both place the
observed predecessor at the observed cost and that match
the observable portion of the path:
Ppredecessor match(t) =
|σ, σ ∈ R(t, d, λρ(d)) ∧ λσ(a′) = λρ(a′) ∧ tσ(a′) = tρ(a′)|
|R(t, d, λρ(d))|
We assume that the a priori probability Papr(t = s) of each
vnode t being the source of a given message is uniform.
The probability that t is the true source given an attacker’s
observation may then be calculated by Bayes theorem:
P (OBSa|t = s) = Pcost match(t)× Ppredecessor match(t)
P (t = s|OBSa) = P (OBSa|t = s)× Papr(t = s)∑
i∈S
P (OBSa|i = s)× Papr(i = s)
Finally, we may use this set of potential source probabilities
to compute an effective source anonymity set size based
on the entropy of the distribution by using the technique
proposed by Serjantov and Danezis [55]:
S = −
∑
t∈S
P (t = s|OBSa) log2(P (t = s|OBSa))
5.3. Complete Path Anonymity Analysis
A passive adversary who observes the construction of a
Dovetail path segment has full knowledge of the remainder
of the segment and partial knowledge of the segment
source. She may learn further information from observing
the return path. We now discuss the complete set of infor-
mation available regarding source and destination identity
at each location on a Dovetail path. When a measurable
cost is available, a set of possible identities can be built
using the techniques defined above in Section 5.2.
Source Identity. The source identity is known to the
source ISP. An attacker at each subsequent AS towards
the matchmaker (which includes the dovetail node) can use
its knowledge of the preceding AS identity, cost from the
source, and all subsequent pathlets up to the matchmaker
to limit the possible source identities. At the matchmaker
itself, for paths of more than three or four hops, the
number of possible sources should be quite large. After the
matchmaker, the amount of information about the source
will be even less.
Destination Identity. The destination identity is known to
every ISP from the matchmaker to the destination ISP due
to the construction request. Any AS on the head segment
out to the matchmaker, but that does not appear on the
data path, has no knowledge of the destination. Between
the source and the dovetail, an attacker can measure the
cost from the destination to her own AS using the data
return path. If the attacker is able to guess which AS on
the head segment serves as the dovetail, she can infer cost
from the destination to the dovetail.
As intended, locations where the source is easily identified
have little information about the destination and vice versa.
The dovetail is the closest AS to the source that learns
destination identity; it is typically the strongest location
for a passive attacker. To avoid elevating the capability of
an attacker located at the dovetail AS, we require that this
AS only appear on the head segment once. Any other AS
that appears twice in a given segment gains no additional
information from its second inclusion.
Each segment of the dovetail path serves a purpose in
maintaining a particular anonymity property; this should
be considered when setting the segment length. The head
segment must be long enough to conceal source identity
from the dovetail, and the tail segment must be long enough
to conceal destination identity from the source ISP. Finally,
we note that uniform random selection of the matchmaker,
uncorrelated with either the source or destination, is effec-
tive in isolating the anonymity properties of our system.
An AS on the head segment can identify the matchmaker,
but this does not help to identify the destination; an AS on
the tail segment may be able to identify the matchmaker,
but this does not help to identify the source.
5.4. Response Timing Attacks
The path diversity used to select each segment should
hinder an attacker’s ability to identify participants from
response timing data. Each potential source could have
used one of many thousand possible routes to reach the
destination, and each of these routes has its own latency
distribution. The superposition of these distributions blurs
the range of possible response times for a source signif-
icantly when compared to shortest path routing and thus
makes distinguishing between different sources harder.
A performance-optimized version of Dovetail could con-
sider geographical distance or latency in its selection of a
matchmaker, which in turn would change the anonymity
properties of the protocol.
We consider this integration of performance and anony-
mity concerns in response to network latency information
to be a rich avenue for further study.
5.5. Availability and Integrity Attacks
Violate routing policy. As with pathlets, all forwarding
tables entries are valid expressions of the routing policy,
and hence it is not possible to construct a path that violates
this policy.
Construct arbitrarily long paths. Our packet design
constrains the maximum length of both encrypted and
unencrypted packet header segments and thus limits the
longest path an adversary intending to waste resources can
construct.
Overload a matchmaker. A matchmaker could be over-
loaded by sending a large number of continuation requests,
but matchmakers are distributed throughout the network
and the effect on clients is minor if the first matchmaker
they contact is unavailable.
Overload a routing vnode. Our forwarding operations
are simple and intended to operate at the full data rate of a
router. Connection construction requires more operations,
but a maximum connection rate could be enforced to
constrain this resource utilization.
Pollute routing tables. Securing the integrity of routing
table updates is an important requirement, but we do not
consider the routing maintenance protocol here hence it is
outside the scope of our work.
Modify packet contents. Dovetail is a layer 3 protocol
and does not provide any protections for the data it is used
to carry. In cases where integrity is important, a higher
layer protocol should be used to provide authentication.
Discard packet data. If the quality of service provided by
a connection drops below some threshold, this would be
observed as a failure, for which the recommended remedy
is to reconnect over a different path. Paths are constructed
by random selection from the available routes, and so
this reconnection is likely to remove any intermediate AS
discarding data.
6. Evaluation
Our proposal is evaluated primarily by simulation, using
a model of the complete Internet at the AS level. In this
section, we first introduce our simulation and input data,
then discuss the anonymity and cost results for path seg-
ments and for complete paths, and conclude by estimating
a variety of resource requirements for our system.
6.1. Simulation Scope
Our simulation models a network of ASes, each con-
taining up to three routing vnodes plus host vnodes to
represent its end users and matchmaking capability. ASes
are connected by pathlets that codify their contractual ar-
rangement; customer, provider, or peer. All pathlets within
an AS have a cost of zero and all pathlets between different
ASes have a cost of one. We simulate the exchange of
routing information at initialization, leading to a unique
routing perspective for each AS that contains all routing
vnodes but not all pathlets. Separately, we simulate packets
at a bit level during a connection, allowing us to test header
design to ensure that routers and the matchmaker could
correctly run the protocol.
Our Internet topology is derived from the CAIDA in-
ferred AS relationship dataset [56]. The dataset contains
sibling relations, which permitted infinitely long valley-free
routes in some circumstances. To avoid optimistic bias, we
replaced all sibling relationships with the more restrictive
peer relationship. This reclassification causes 5.5% of the
network to lose complete reachability, so we disallow traffic
originating from or terminating at these ASes. We consider
each AS without customer ASes to be a service provider
for end users and add a host vnode to represent these
users. Ideally, we would model the number of users, but
accurate ISP customer size data are not available. Rather
than risk skewing our conclusions, we restrict ourselves
to measuring anonymity based on the number of possible
source or destination ISPs, recognizing that some ISPs are
far larger than others.
We consider a mixture of ASes following the strict and
loose valley-free routing policies defined in Section 4.2.
Experimentation shows that when all ASes follow strict
valley-free, the number of routing options is limited, but
introducing even a small proportion of loose valley-free
ASes leads to far greater diversity. 10% loose valley-free
ASes gives a median of 91,000 options for each path, and
we use this topology for the remainder of our evaluation.
Studies show that strict valley-free routing is not universal
today [44], but we acknowledge that our selection of 10%
is arbitrary.
6.2. Single Segment Performance
To select a path segment, the source compiles a set of
available routes using a modified depth first search. Our
implementation limits this set to a maximum cost of 13,
based on the longest distance present in the network, and
also a maximum of 20,000 routes at each path cost to
limit computation. We first select a cost from the set of
available costs (i.e. costs with at least one route) and then
select a random route of this cost. We present results for the
following four path selection algorithms, expressed in terms
of the probability P (λ) that each will select a particular
available cost λ. In all cases, k is a constant specific to the
algorithm:
Shortest. Shortest possible path is selected in all cases:
P (λ) = 1 if λ = λshortest, or 0 otherwise.
Uniform. Each cost is equally likely: P (λ) ∝ 1.
Exponential. Longer paths are less likely: P (λ) ∝ kλ.
Exponential4. Longer paths are less likely, but costs under
four are prohibited: P (λ) = 0 if λ < 4, or P (λ) ∝ kλ
otherwise.
Figure 10a presents a distribution of the cost produced by
these algorithms for random source-destination pairs, while
Figure 10b presents the source anonymity set size distribu-
tion as measured by an attacker at the destination. These
results demonstrate that all the algorithms that produce a
non-deterministic cost succeed in achieving a meaningful
anonymity improvement over the shortest path algorithm,
by three bits of entropy in the best case and over one
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
log2  Source Anonymity Set
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
Fr
ac
tio
n
Shortest
Uniform
Exponential
Exponential4
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Path Cost
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
Fr
ac
tio
n
0
2
4
6
8
10
0 2 4 6 8 100
2
4
6
8
10
0 2 4 6 8 10
Source Anonymity Set (x1000)
Ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
An
on
ym
ity
 S
et
 (x
10
00
)
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 10. Comparison of segment path selection algorithms: a) Cumulative source anonymity set size distribution,
b) Cumulative cost distribution, c) Source anonymity set size vs. effective set size
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Figure 11. Source and destination anonymity set size along the complete path
bit for the majority of cases. Algorithms that select long
paths more frequently achieve better anonymity but result
in a higher average cost. The change from Exponential to
Exponential4 is particularly striking, showing a dramatic
improvement in worst case anonymity from the exclusion
of short paths, with only a modest cost increase. The Expo-
nential4 algorithm results in an average cost approximately
25% greater than shortest path routing, and yet it achieves
an anonymity set containing over half the network in 98%
of the tests.
In Figure 10c, we compare the set size metric with
the effective set size metric. This data is from a smaller
network, approximately one quarter of the full Internet, and
is presented on a linear scale. The data shows that our non-
deterministic methods have a slightly smaller effective set
size once their cost selection probability is fully incorpo-
rated, but this reduction is small. The largest reduction in
set size is around 0.35 bits. This shows that cost window
selection is effective at limiting information gain by the
attacker.
6.3. Complete Path Performance
We now evaluate the anonymity and cost properties of
complete paths. Dovetail includes parameters that users
can configure to trade performance against anonymity. Our
objective here is to demonstrate the anonymity limit of this
sliding scale, but many users will prefer a lower setting. The
parameter settings we use are:
Dovetail to Matchmaker Cost = Two. Provides strong
limits on matchmaker capability without requiring that
dovetail and matchmaker are adjacent.
Source to Matchmaker Algorithm = Exponential6.
Effectively delivers Exponential4 at the dovetail.
Dovetail to Destination Algorithm = Exponential4.
Shown in Section 6.2 to provide near maximum anonymity.
In our experiment, we select source and destination
hosts at random and construct a dovetail path between
them. The matchmaker generates eight tail path options
and the source selects one from this set. Where possible,
the source selects an option that does not reuse a head AS,
but in 23% of paths constructed all options required such
reuse.3 We measure the source and destination anonymity
set size observable by an attacker at each location in the
path. Random selection of a matchmaker decouples the
source and destination anonymity sets, and therefore we
can also consider the source-destination unlinkability, i.e.
the number of potential source-destination pairs associated
with an observed connection, to be the product of the source
and destination anonymity set sizes. Figure 11 presents
the distribution of these three properties at a series of key
locations along the path, and Figure 12 presents the cost
distribution, with the cost of shortest path routing included
for comparison with IP and LAP.
Each successive step adds ambiguity to the source iden-
tity. At the dovetail AS, source anonymity is approximately
equal to network size in 80% of cases. Destination identity
is known at the dovetail and all subsequent locations, but
locations prior to the dovetail are unable to calculate a
meaningful destination identity. No location except the
source is able to clearly link source and destination. The
AS immediately preceding the dovetail is most likely to
be duplicated in head and tail segments, being adjacent to
an AS that is always present in both. As illustrated by the
destination anonymity for “Before Dovetail”, this occurred
in 5% of our experiments. The dovetail may partially
calculate source identity in around 20% of cases, but this is
limited to around one thousand possible source ISPs, each
containing many users. Figure 12 shows that a Dovetail
path passes through approximately 2.5 times more ASes
than the shortest path routing used in the current Internet.
This is a modest penalty when compared to the prevailing
option for anonymity today; an anonymous circuit in Tor
typically passes through three relays for a total of four IP
paths, including six more last-mile connections than a direct
path, and incurs additional processing and queuing delays
at each relay.
3. We plan in future work to develop a heuristic to select dovetail
vnodes with a lower probability of reuse.
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6.4. Resource Utilization
Rather than proposing a near-term solution, we aim to
show that privacy is a feasible feature to include in future
routing protocol designs. Nevertheless, we now briefly
consider a variety of resource requirements to demonstrate
that implementation would be feasible.
Host memory utilization. Each Dovetail host must main-
tain a model of the Internet to generate routes. In the 2012
dataset we use there are 252,666 visible pathlets, of which
an average of 22% are known, requiring 680kB.
Router memory utilization. A Dovetail forwarding table
scales with the number of local peers and not the total
number of Internet prefixes as with BGP. All forwarding
information is carried by the packet itself, and so a router
need not store any information per connection.
Router latency. The only cryptographic operation re-
quired to forward a data packet is a symmetric decryption
of one word. This is the same task performed by LAP;
Hsiao et al. measure an additional latency of under one
microsecond in a software-based implementation of their
system [18].
Transmission efficiency. A Dovetail packet must specify
a complete path rather than only an endpoint, potentially
leading to large headers and low efficiency. The average
header length in our experiments is 92 bytes. Given an
MTU of 1500 bytes, this represents a 3.5% reduction in
payload compared to IPv6. LAP would require a 60 byte
header.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we presented Dovetail, a next-generation
Internet routing protocol, and have demonstrated that it
provides a workable solution for anonymity at the network
layer. The overhead is approximately 2.5 times that of
shortest path routing when configured to provide near
complete anonymity against our chosen attacker, and we in-
clude mechanisms to exchange anonymity for performance.
We have demonstrated key aspects of the feasibility and
effectiveness of this direction and hope this this motivates
serious consideration of privacy as a requirement in the
development of other next-generation routing protocols.
We do not advocate an Internet without identity. Rather,
we propose that identity exposure be reserved for substan-
tial relationships and avoided for ephemeral relationships.
This research direction is still in its infancy, and much work
remains. We believe the most pressing matter is to develop
diversity in the solution space by considering how privacy-
preserving features might be integrated into other leading
layer 3 proposals. Beyond this, there are user interface
questions to explore in the provision of clear and mean-
ingful network privacy choices and in characterizing the
user response to these choices. This characterization will
provide a better understanding of the resource requirements
for network layer anonymity systems and of the motivations
for service providers. Finally, further work remains with the
Dovetail protocol. Network latency information should be
incorporated into both the path selection algorithms and the
anonymity assessments. Our evaluation should be extended
to a wider range of network assumptions and additional
privacy/performance settings.
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